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Abstract  
 This paper examines the relationship between neoliberalism and patterns of violence in 
Latin American cities. I argue that those neoliberal policies which have so impacted key agricul-
tural and manufacturing sectors in Latin America also disrupt economically-driven social rela-
tions, making that the region’s transition to democracy a violent one. Although transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy as a whole remove old relations between the government and the 
public, the criminalization of poverty as created and perpetuated by neoliberal ideology leads to 
higher rates of incarceration while colluding with criminal organizations in order to avoid 
lengthy and expensive urban renewal programs. When forced to confront any such collusion, 
states often turn to extrajudicial killings and widespread punitive measures. However, this is per-
haps beginning to change. In selected case studies, the author analyzes the benefits and potential 
future of community-based policing in response to the challenges faced by Venezuela, Mexico, 
and Brazil in tackling these issues. 
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Introduction 
 Most living in Western democracies tend to assume that with increased wealth and a rep-
resentative government come decreased levels of violent crime. Especially in the United States, a 
rhetoric of bringing people happier, safer lives tends to accompany pushes for economic reform. 
Even after the end of the Cold War’s epic battle between state-controlled economies and neolib-
eralism, world economic agencies continue to draw a correlation between personal safety and 
national wealth.  However, empirical evidence in Latin America, along with highly publicized 
patterns of violence, from the 2014 Olympic Protests in Rio to the infamous Mexican Drug War, 
is far from supportive. More troublesome still is the accompaniment of police brutality in these 
statistical increases in violence. Why? Are such trends simply an example of a failure to develop 
institutions strong enough to handle an open market, or are they the effect of new state-minimiz-
ing policies? 
 I argue that neoliberal policies across Latin America, by displacing labor, in fact increase 
rates of violence in major Latin American cities. However, this process is not simply through the 
so-called ‘criminalization of poverty,’ the means by which states and societies criminalize pover-
ty itself. Instead, the process of removing the state from the economy, by disrupting old social 
norms and privatizing security forces, also creates openings for self-proclaimed ‘civilian defense’ 
groups to impose their own will on communities in major Latin American cities. At the same 
time, the region’s democratization provides an opportunity for a tyranny of the majority to 
emerge. The poor are punished for being poor by a wider population that sees them as inherently 
dangerous, while politicians seek votes by playing off of the middle and upper classes’ fear of the 
poor. Thus democracy paves the way not only for far harsher measures when dealing with petty 
  Estevao !2
crime, but also makes possible private and independent security as more communities turn to the 
latter for respite from the corruption of state forces. Ironically, the problems generated by these 
self-defense and private security forces are made possible by democratic processes. 
 Such a combination is uniquely dangerous in that it both increases levels of violent crime, 
and actively delegitimizes already weakened states. This trend is especially troubling in Latin 
America, as the population continues to express worrying levels of skepticism about democracy, 
a fundamental distrust of state mechanisms, and the continuation of corporate behaviors in elec-
tions which inhibit change in crucial areas that would enable higher levels of human develop-
ment throughout the region.  
The Cold War to the War on Drugs: A Historical Narrative 
 Examining the consequences of police violence in Latin American cities first requires a 
recounting of the economic history of the region which has in turn generated an increase in per-
manent unemployment. In so doing, the specific political, economic, and social factors which 
have contributed to the development of neoliberalism as an economic logic, and the global im-
plementation of that logic, deserve an exploration.  
Open Markets, Small Government: The Development of the Neoliberal State 
 ‘Neoliberalism,’ like terms like ‘globalization’ or ‘democracy,’ lacks a singular definition. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, I will use the commonly-held political definition of ne-
oliberalism as a cohesive series of policies which minimize state involvement in the national 
economy (Oksala, 2011). Structural adjustment programs, an emphasis on external-oriented 
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growth strategies (market liberalization), and stable inflation all constitute economic policy in 
neoliberalism (Joronen, 2013). 
 Contemporary neoliberal ideology is largely the brainchild of Cold War interpretations by 
Friedrich Hayek, most famous for his work The Road to Serfdom. A direct response to the tyran-
ny of 20th century fascist and communist regimes, Hayek interprets the state and the economy as 
two mechanisms for advancing or withholding individual liberty (Feser, 2006). By Hayek’s log-
ic, the state which aims to advance individual freedoms must therefore limit its own involve-
ment. The market functions as a smoothly-operating machine, and interference, rather than the 
Keynesian conception of money as propelling industry forward, in fact disrupts the balance of 
credit between producers and consumer-workers. Rather than encourage domestic growth, this 
disruption restricts the money supply, thereby driving up inflation and unemployment (Feser, 
2006). 
 However, as David Harvey (2007), as well as other political economists ( Deukmedjian, 
2013; Goldfrank and Schrank, 2009; Joronen, 2013) note, neoliberalism is more than an econom-
ic strategy. A neoliberal economy requires a fundamentally neoliberal state. Despite the interpre-
tation of such a state as being entirely market driven, it in fact relies heavily on institutions, both 
formal and informal. Without a proper enforcement of individual property rights through mecha-
nisms of state control, international capitalists are hesitant to invest in economies in which their 
property might be at risk (Harvey, 2007).  
  Estevao !4
The Dominance of the Washington Consensus 
  
 The narrative is well-rehearsed: the Soviet Union and the United States battle for political 
supremacy throughout the so-called “Third World.” The choice for Latin America is clear: be-
come an enemy of the United States by siding with the “Red Menace,” or bow before the imperi-
alist power to the north. With few exceptions (such as Cuba and Chile) the region attempts to 
straddle both superpowers with a leftist agenda becoming their populist roots, and appease the 
United States by leaving private companies to their own devices. Powerful caudillos, or “strong 
men” would make promises of economic reform, equality, and employment, even as they rolled 
into the capital on tanks in the middle of yet another military coup (Bernal-Meza and Chris-
tensen, 2012).  
 The weapon of choice in the destruction of underdevelopment: import substitution indus-
trialization. The process was meant to develop a domestic market strong enough to eventually 
compete on an international stage. However, doing so required an injection of capital that Latin 
American states lacked. Fortunately for El Presidente, cheap credit was becoming all the more 
readily available (Iniguez-Montiel, 2014).  
 By the 1970s, so-called ‘petrodollars’ from OPEC members reaping the benefits of the 
1973 Oil Crisis were flooding banks with cheap credit, gladly borrowed by the development 
states of Latin America (Oately, 2005). By the 1980s, however, the long-term economic devel-
opment strategy of import-substitution industrialization, meant to generate new sectors and boost 
employment, was no longer working. Instead, these states found themselves in the middle of the 
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economic ‘Tequila Crisis’ spreading from Mexico to Argentina.  Inflation rose, and employment 1
sank (Kohli, 2009).  
 Under pressure from both Washington and domestic elites craving international markets, 
Latin American governments adopt the “Washington Consensus” model, that package of open 
markets, privatization, and fiscal austerity. Out with the old and inefficient nationalized compa-
nies and hefty tariffs, and in with privatization and budget cuts. Now, increasing gross domestic 
product would come from engagement with the international market, not by shying away from it 
(Harvey, 2007). 
The Changing Role of ‘El Presidente:’ The Democracy Wave 
 Such an economic upheaval did not occur in a vacuum. Even as neoliberal restructuring 
redefined the economic playing field, democracy also spread across the region, in large part as a 
response to the economic dysfunction and displacement caused by the recession and subsequent 
‘shock therapy,’ (the sudden and dramatic opening of the economy to the global market). Brazil, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Colom-
bia, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, and Bolivia all underwent a period of democratization between 
the 1980s and the mid 2000s (Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010). While democratization is often con-
sidered a positive development, the process of becoming a democracy involves the breakdown of 
existing, authoritarian institutions, both formal and informal. When combined with an economic 
 The “Tequila Crisis,” also known as the Mexican Peso Crisis, was the 1994 rapid devaluation of the 1
Mexican peso against the dollar. The crisis was caused by capital flight, first in Mexico but then spreading 
to several other countries in Latin America, including Brazil and the rest of the Southern Cone of South 
America (Oately, 2005). 
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program which tends to cause displacement, those institutions pave the way for policies more 
likely to generate violence from both within and outside of the state.   
 On the whole, democracies tend to manage neoliberal economic transitions very differ-
ently from authoritarian regimes. Instead of decrees supported by militaries, responsive democ-
racies must negotiate the effects of neoliberalism. Indeed, the level of responsiveness within a 
democracy will impact the degree to which an already disruptive transition will lead to further 
destabilization. A more responsive political system would be able to demand social safety nets to 
mitigate the negative side of neoliberalism, as well as demand a higher degree of accountability 
from the state’s representatives themselves, including the police (Wiatrowski, Pino, and 
Pritchard, 2008).    
 However, within every democracy the loudest voices are the most powerful. In societies 
that already suffered from high levels of inequality, such as most Latin American states, democ-
racy does not necessarily lead to the aforementioned improvements in governance (Wiatrowski, 
Pino, and Pritchard, 2008). Rather, the poor are unable to financially persuade politicians, as the 
former’s economic input is impacted yet does not impact the state’s liberalization of trade. A 
small-scale farmer might lose her ability to sell maize for a livable price, but Mexico’s national 
food prices will likely decrease with imported maize instead (Bernal-Meza and Christiansen, 
2012).  
 With the power of the military behind them, authoritarian governments had no need to 
genuinely fear backlash for the ill-effects of economic experimentation. In Chile, for example, 
Pinochet was able to use the “Chicago Boys” and their hard right economic policies to turn the 
country into a neoliberal economic dream (Boas and Ganse-Morse, 2009). However, his role as 
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dictator also sheltered him from having any real fear of repercussion from the population which 
struggled under massive cuts to social welfare spending. Indeed, so successful were Pinochet’s 
policies at reducing inflation that he remained surprisingly well received until his voluntary de-
parture in 1990 (Boas and Ganse-Morse, 2009). 
 Nowhere was this process more noticeable than in the case of urban migration. Mike 
Davis (2007) explains the differences between the development of Latin American slums and 
those in Europe and Asia. Under Latin American dictatorships and juntas, the emphasis was sel-
dom on social welfare programs, or on incorporating informal settlements into the wider city. 
Instead, these cities were meant to serve as a vehicle for dictatorships to demonstrate the state’s 
power, progress, and Europeanization (Goldfrank and Schrank, 2009).  A massive increase in 
migrants would damage the carefully cultivated urban investment environment. Where East 
Asian economies like South Korea and China focused on bringing people into cities in order to 
generate cheap labor for export-oriented industrialization strategies, Latin American dictators 
were far stricter about who could and could not enter the urban workforce. While it is true infor-
mal housing districts did emerge in periods of dictatorship, they were frequently demolished, and 
their explosion in size and capacity did not occur until after the beginning of the democracy 
wave (Davis, 2007).  
The New Left  
 Despite global economic engagement and a reduction of barriers to trade, the successes of 
neoliberalism are highly debatable. An open trade policy was not providing the long-term eco-
nomic growth needed to push Latin America into the “first wold” of high technology and fi-
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nance. Indeed, from the years 1980 to 1999, the height of neoliberalism in Latin America, GDP 
per capita across the region was consistently erratic. One year GDP per capita would jump a 
thousand dollars per person, only to plummet by another thousand two years later (World Bank, 
2014). 
 Worryingly, even in those countries with superficial gains, such as Mexico, whose 
maquiladoras have inspired hopes of long-term economic growth, gains have remained isolated 
by sector (Moreno-Brid and Paunovic, 2008). Brazil, whose economic growth prospects looked 
so promising only a few years ago, appears to have squandered the gains. Though GDP projec-
tions look upward, the 
numbers have certainly 
fallen far behind the 
hopes of only five years 
ago (World Bank, 
2014a), as demonstrated 
by Figure 1, at right. 
While the impact of 
funding two global events may have certainly played a role in the setback, so too has a sluggish 
economy with minimal job creation. 
  In response to these failures of neoliberalism (or of its implementation, if neoliberalism’s 
advocates are to be believed) a new school of thought has emerged. The “New Left,” as Moreno-
Brid and Paunovic (2008) have termed it, is not an exact return to import substitution industrial-
ization. Rather, it centers the discussion again on populism and public spending, deepening the 
Figure 1: Brazilian GDP Growth (% Annual) 2000-2013
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role of the state in a greater level of response to concerns voiced by the citizenry (Moreno-Brid 
and Paunovic, 2008). The ousting of that Mexican powerhouse, the PRI, the election of Lula and 
his left-wing Worker’s Party in Brazil, and the ongoing support for Hugo Chavez and his policies 
even after Chavez’s death all demonstrate an increasing willingness of the populace at large to 
make their voices heard in the public sphere.  
 While always a fairly left-leaning region, Latin America’s governments have generally 
been able to promise sweeping reforms for the sake of gathering votes, while never changing 
those problematic policies. Geoffrey Hodgson (2005) and the political-economic school of 
thought which focuses on institutional development pose the suggestion that a growing middle 
class tends to precede demands for political participation (Hodgson, 2005). In Latin American 
countries where a middle class has indeed emerged, economic ties to the United States and West-
ern Europe have run concurrent with the adoption of new constitutions and implementation of 
free and fair elections. However, this democratization process, in melding with economic policy 
that excludes a substantial part of the population, leads to not simply a removal of so-called 
“safety nets,” but in fact actively removes ‘undesirables’ from the political community (Mar-
tinez, 2009). This process has largely manifested itself in the form of begrudging acceptance of 
violence against civilians by police, and increasingly punitive measures against the poor. 
Popular Lynchings and Police Violence: The Criminalization of Poverty in Latin America 
The Ballot and the Bullet: Rising Violence in the Face of Democracy 
 The morality of economic policy is not within the scope of this paper. However, while 
Hayek certainly may have intended to keep the suffering of those living under totalitarian 
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regimes from spreading as much as Reagan or Thatcher genuinely feared Soviet domination, the 
system that emerged only served to deepen economic divides, prevent social mobility, and keep 
developing economies out in the cold. As wealthy western economies have begun to recognize 
(as indicated by the popularity of Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty First Century or 
any number of popular Nicholas Kristoff articles on inequality in America), too much removal of 
state mechanisms, most notably social safety nets and investments, has generated profoundly dis-
ruptive, even backward, patterns of poverty and criminalization. Latin America, far from escap-
ing these cycles, has experienced an upsurge in violence and stagnation.  
 From Sao Paulo to Ciudad Juarez, cities across Latin America have seen an increase in 
per-capita murders, assaults, thefts, and lynchings. Nowhere is this increase more stark than in 
reported murder rates. Between 1985 and 2005 alone, the number of murdered adults between 
the ages of 15 and 44 actually increased in most of the region’s most heavily populated countries 
(Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010). In some, like Venezuela, the murder rate for adults between 30 
and 44 years of age more than tripled, from 15 to 47 murders per 100,000 urban residents (World 
Bank, 2014c). While some degree of increase is perhaps unsurprising considering the rapid 
growth of these urban areas, these increases remain both startling and concerning because the 
rate per 100,000 itself increases, rather than simply the number of people who are being mur-
dered. These rates are not simply not found in other developing regions whose economies or 
government transitions are comparable to those in Latin America. Vietnam, for example, had a 
reported homicide rate of 3 per 100,000, while India, to whom Brazil is often economically com-
pared, had twelve reported homicides between 2010 and 2012, nearly half of Brazil’s in any one 
of those three years (WorldBank, 2014e).    
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 These statistics disguise one of the more disturbing trends: the increase in police-on-civil-
ian violence. A surprising percentage of these reported murders are actually extrajudicial killings 
by police officers (Ungar, 2013). Far from an unexpected phenomena, I argue this is the result of 
an ongoing process through which the poor become criminalized by the same government that 
originally implemented polices meant to lift all economic boats.  
Rise of the Informal Sector 
 With neoliberalism comes economic displacement. As Susan Eckstein (2006) argues, im-
port substitution industrialization, while largely considered a failure, did provide workers with a 
high degree of protection from international market forces, as well as higher levels of civic en-
gagement. The removal of those tariffs and non-tariff barriers in turn disrupted that  relationship. 
The influx of cheap imports put those less efficient businesses out of work, displacing thousands 
of urban workers (Eckstein, 2006). Worsening the situation, industrial technologies have actively 
reduced the number of required employees (Marx, Stoker, and Tayneet, 2013). Instead, patterns 
of arrests within cities as well as new government policies have indicated a shift in employment 
distribution. Those workers who lost their jobs in the liberalization of the market, or those whose 
decision to move to the city in search of work comes up empty, turn to the informal sector (Gold-
frank and Shrank, 2009) . 
 This informalization has fueled criminalization and violence in a number of ways. At a 
purely logistical level, informal housing needs to draw on resources outside of legal channels. 
Attempts at solving informal institutions of need based theft, such as formalizing electricity lines 
between the rest of the city and slums, both criminalize existing practices, and end the access res-
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idents required and to which they had become accustomed (Felbab-Brown, 2011). Such is newly 
the case in Brazil’s favelas. Where households previously tapped into the state’s power grid in-
formally, after the pre-Olympic “improvement” programs, such access now requires payment, 
both criminalizing informal practices and limiting access (Tianhao, 2012). 
 However, the most common form of criminalized informal activity is instead the informal 
retail sector. These “criminal enterprises,” as Mexico’s Civic Culture Law of 2004 (Becker and 
Muller, 2013) calls them, take the form of small street vendors selling fruits and vegetables, pi-
rated movies, clothing, and other cheap products. Hawking their wares on the sidewalks and in 
the wide plazas of cities does good business, but their presence also has a tendency to frighten 
investors (Becker and Muller, 2013).  
 Latin America’s leftist tendencies do not prevent it from engaging in the international 
market. Indeed, if anything many Latin American countries have ramped up efforts to attract in-
ternational investment since the Washington Consensus was first introduced. Mexico continues 
to court investors for its manufacturing sector, while Brazil attempts to sell itself as the new eco-
nomic hotspot by hosting the 2014 World Cup, the 2016 Olympics, and increasing its service and 
energy sectors (World Bank, 2014c). These efforts, while lucrative in today’s market, require the 
kind of capital investment Latin American countries tend to be unable to make. Instead, they 
must present themselves as an underdog: scrappy enough to provide a real return for investors, 
yet poor enough to suggest tantalizingly cheap labor (Oatley, 2005). However, when potential 
investors go to investigate the city housing the factory or to hold meetings with local business 
people, they tend to see groups of street vendors in downtown areas or in front of public build-
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ings as indications of public instability and a weak domestic economy. Such concerns then affect 
the company’s decision whether or not to invest in the country (Becker and Muller, 2013).  
 Making the task of appealing to international investors all the more difficult is the incon-
venient fact that in most Latin American countries, slums have only recently been recognized by 
the state (Huget and de Carvahlo, 2008). Because of the restrictive nature of movement to Latin 
American cities before democratization, these communities were themselves illegal and infor-
mal, reflected in the structure of houses built on top of one another, with little access to formal 
state infrastructure or to public services. This obstruction left a state-sized hole in the every day 
management of slums, a hole eagerly filled by criminal enterprises (Felbab-Brown, 2011). 
 The average Latin American government thus faces a choice: either leave the street ven-
dors and lose the same investments that have the potential to improve the domestic economy, 
thereby providing those same vendors with a place in the formal sector, or crack down on the 
informal sector to attract foreign capital. Most governments appear to choose the latter. In Mexi-
co City alone, over two hundred informal vendors and sex workers a day have been arrested un-
der the new Civic Culture Law, which lists no fewer than forty-three new types of offenses pun-
ishable by monetary fines or up to thirty-six hours in jail (Muller, 2013).  An attempt to “re-
claim” these spaces from the poor, the new laws effectively make poverty and the pursuit of em-
ployment in the informal sector a criminal act, criminalizing poverty itself.  
 While these processes isolate significant portions of the population, many continue to ar-
gue it is ‘worth it.’ After all, thirty years ago, no Latin American country (apart from perhaps Ar-
gentina) would have been considered middle income. Today, however, Brazil, Mexico, Argenti-
na, and Chile, to name only a few, are all classified as middle income. Indeed, without the gains 
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lost from violent crime and corruption, and the fear of of the two, some economists (Joronen, 
Kohl, Maia and Menezes) project an economic environment much closer to that of middle-in-
come European states. Indeed, the region has  potential future advantages in an open market with 
its linguistic connections to Western Europe, its proximity to the United States, and its natural 
and structural resources. Considering its gains thus far, many politicians claim the region’s 
economies should not be so quick to abandon neoliberalism, but should instead stay the course 
(Portes and Smith, 2008).  
 The process has been solidified by the continuation, even intensification, of the associa-
tion in the hearts and minds of both the public and the government, between criminal organiza-
tions and the poor (Zimring and Johnson, 2006). The lucrative nature of the drug trade makes 
overpowering and out-arming local communities a relatively simple task. Particularly after the 
ascent of cocaine and the crack-cocaine market, cartels have completely taken over the manage-
ment of slum areas in across the region (Briceno-Leon and Zubillaga, 2002).  While some resi-
dents turn to jobs in the drug trade willingly, others are reportedly forced (Martinez, 2009). 
However, the omnipresence of the cartels makes drawing little distinction between civilian and 
cartel member easy for police units.   
The Role of Militarized Police in Increasing Violence 
 More often than not a product and vestige of military dictatorships, police presence in 
Latin America is in turns resented and ignored by local communities. Over years of relative au-
tonomy and interaction with cartels, the police, never seen as a bastion of public service, have 
grown ever more corrupt. A wide variety of studies and policy briefs have attempted to under-
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stand the root cause of this corruption, to come to the general conclusion, articulated by Diane 
Davis (2013), as a combination of low pay, a high risk occupation, and a high level of autonomy 
from any sort of public scrutiny (Davis, 2013).  
 Like the military, police forces in Latin America have been structurally separated from 
the rest of the government. Often, police forces are not supervised at the municipal or regional 
level, which would enforce accountability to the local population in incidents of police brutality, 
or forge strong lines of communication between local communities and police forces.  As a re-
sult, most Latin Americans have come to see police not as protectors of public safety, but as just 
another face of cartel-style violence. Latinobarometro, a major data collector and surveyor, asked 
1200 Mexican citizens for their level of confidence in the police. An astounding forty five per-
cent of those surveyed had “no confidence at all” in the police. Colombia and Brazil each 
demonstrated a mere twelve and five percent who demonstrated “a lot of confidence,” respec-
tively (Latinobarometro, 2013). Clearly, Latin America’s public security faces a crisis of legiti-
macy. 
 Despite this disconnect between the citizenry and the police, governments across Latin 
America are using the same process to remove cartels as they have for informal street vendors. 
Since the blossoming of the drug trade between Latin America, Europe, and North America, 
governments have begun special projects to neutralize cartel control over slums (Munoz, 2014). 
Such projects have previously taken the form of a more militarized force operating under the log-
ic that the police can outgun or physically outmaneuver the cartels. Most notably, after the deba-
cle that was the Colombian government for years in the face of cartel impunity and the subse-
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quent success of the militarized fight against the notorious Medellin Cartel and killing of Pablo 
Escobar, other Latin American states followed suit (US Embassy in Bogota, 2014).  
 Much of the success of this militarization came from the assistance and encouragement of 
the United States. The success of the multimillion dollar Plan Colombia, an assistance package 
for the Colombian government which provided the weapons and training used to dismantle much 
of the Medellin Cartel, was then used as a template for later aid flowing from the United States 
to Latin American governments struggling with cartel-based violence (US Embassy in Bogota, 
2014). By 2008, the United States government passed a new bill, the Merida Initiative, which 
provided a similar level of military assistance and training to the Mexican government in its fight 
against the cartels (Muller, 2013).   
 The result of this collaboration has been to retain, if not strengthen, the longstanding ten-
dency of Latin American states to blur the lines between the military and the police. The architect 
of many respected police policies, the United States has itself undergone a period of quiet milita-
rization of civilian police forces. At the same time, the United States actively encouraged crack-
downs on minor criminal offenses (Zimring and Johnson, 2006). Perhaps the best example of this 
process took place under New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton and the imple-
mentation of James Wilson and George Kelling’s “broken windows theory.” The theory argues 
by raising repercussions for smaller offenses, criminal behaviors at all levels are better discour-
aged (Roberts, 2014). 
 In conjunction with this militarized policy, Latin American governments began in earnest 
to push harder against the cartels by attempting to mitigate collusion between police and criminal 
enterprises. However, as O’Malley and Hutchinson (2007) argue, police forces in Latin America 
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that use private security forces ultimately have few benefits. In reality, private security compa-
nies use the same labor force as the state. Indeed, low salaries drive police officers to join private 
security companies for a second shift (Ungar, 2007). Equally common is the strategy of increas-
ing one’s career prospects by moving between the public and private sectors. An officer might 
begin in the public sector, before moving to a private company to gain work experience and a 
pay raise, and then moving back into the public sector in a much higher position (O’Malley and 
Hutchinson, 2007). The relationship between these private security forces and rates of violence 
serves as a basis for most of the theory surrounding increased violence and neoliberalism more 
broadly in Latin America. 
Just a Phase? Conflicting Theories and Literature on Violence 
  
 What mechanisms drive the perpetuation of this level of violence? At a theoretical level, 
four camps have emerged explaining both the persistence of this violence, and what the future 
holds. For some theorists, there is no connection between neoliberalism and violence. Instead, 
democracy is the driving factor. However, for others, economics determines whether a democrat-
ic transition will suffer from an increase in violent crime.   
Casualty of the Greater Good: The “Modernization” Thesis 
 Neoliberalism as policy is known to create structures which shrink the labor market ac-
cessible to the most marginalized, a process described in depth by Susan Eckstein (2006). A fo-
cus on individual over collective rights also creates a narrative of individual responsibility over 
collective support, and is generally used to actively undermine populist policy. If in exchange for 
faster growth rates the  national economy is focused on reducing unemployment in the Keyne-
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sian sense, neoliberals argue the resulting glut of both labor and money both reduces the quality 
of goods and services (if everyone is guaranteed a job, the incentive for high quality performance 
is low), and drives up rates of inflation (Kholi, 2009).  Because high inflation rates make pur-
chasing goods and services more expensive, it reduces the market, effectively eliminating eco-
nomic opportunities for the vast majority of people. The best way to prevent such an economic 
crisis is to cater to the capital market. While not on the surface the most democratic choice, ne-
oliberals would argue by prizing capital accumulation over job security, more people will actual-
ly attain a higher level of material wealth than they would in a leftist economic model (Martinez, 
2009).  
 A necessary aspect of such catering to capital involves the preservation of private proper-
ty as a sacred right. Extending centuries back in Western cannon, the idea of “life, liberty, and 
property,” as John Locke put it, has been exported and encouraged everywhere Anglo influences 
have spread through either colonization or soft power. In the preservation of private property, 
more authoritarian states and polices are generally more successful at bringing in outside capital 
precisely because they adapt more militant policies toward anything which could potentially 
jeopardize private property, putting them in the good graces of investors, and in a disciplinary 
relationship with the average citizen (Kohli, 2009).  
  This highly-disruptive process, when combined with the already traumatic shift from au-
thoritarianism to democracy increases violent crime. However, as modernizationists like Neu-
mann and Berger, as recounted by LaFree and Tseloni (2006), argue, this level of violence will 
decrease as democracy gains legitimacy within the system (LaFree and Teloni, 2006). Though 
unfortunate, the criminalization of poverty is simply the byproduct of capital accumulation, 
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largely unintentional, and can be gradually expected to decrease as the democracy expands to 
include the poor (LaFree and Tseloni, 2006).  Using the same logic, the development of a private 
security complex does not indicate a crisis, nor is it even necessarily unexpected. Instead, the 
government aims to cut costs where it deems reasonable in an effort to prevent raises in inflation. 
Criminalization and Intent: Foucault’s Prison Complex 
 Theorists like Michel Foucault argue this process is not an unfortunate result of well-in-
tentioned capitalism, but is instead deliberate. Foucault’s theses on disciplinary society as articu-
lated by Deukmedjian (2013) argue that the criminalization of poverty is simply a facet of a 
wider securitization of public space. Under neoliberalism, argues Foucault, the dedication to cap-
ital accumulation and consumerism moves the focus of society and the determinants of govern-
ment action from the collective to the individual. Just as the individual with capital power bene-
fits from the system, so too is the individual responsible for his or her own success within that 
system (Deukmedjian, 2013). Those with capital, in having more clout in government decision 
making, actively develop systems of disciplining other individuals falling outside the market. 
Operating on the same individual level as the market itself, the securitization and discipline of 
society also takes place at the individual level. 
 The privatization of that mode of disciplinary action and source of “stateness” in general, 
in other words Weber’s monopoly of violence, is the natural progression of capital’s control over 
governance. As such, the privatization of security in Latin America serves as a means of better 
regulating the individual’s movements and behaviors in a kind of contemporary panopticon. 
Such is reflected in the regulation of “public space” in Latin American cities, from evictions of 
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vendors from public squares to enforced curfews in dangerous areas (Becker and Muller, 2013). 
Considering the strong and direct relationship between capital’s interests and a privately funded 
police force, a Foucauldian perspective would argue that this privatization of security should in-
deed be feared, but will also remain a force to be reckoned with until some kind of seismic shift 
in the consciousness of the marginalized. 
The (Il)Legitimate State 
 In a different school of thought, Moreno-Brid and Paunovic (2008) argue that police vio-
lence and resulting changes in internal security structures are not a deliberate process. Rather, the 
adoption of neoliberalism and increased police replacement with privatized security companies 
are only indirectly related. Neoliberalism as a whole is a recognized source of political tension 
across Latin America. With such widespread economic displacement and a consistent popular 
affiliation between the Washington Consensus and American neocolonialism, Moreno-Bridd and 
Paunovic claim it is unsurprising Latin American states would shift leftward (Moreno-Brid and 
Paunovic, 2008).  
 However, this shift to the left is not simple populism, which would suggest a rejection of 
previous policy. Instead, this “post-neoliberalism” aims for both a revival of state involvement in 
development, and a commitment to engagement in the international economy (Grugel and Rig-
girozzi, 2012). Part of this redefinition of the relationship between the people and the state re-
quires the modification and improvement of the police forces, the face of the state to the majority 
of marginalized populations. Especially in slums, this redefinition will require the restoration (or 
introduction) of legitimacy of the state’s ability to control violence in the public sphere. The pri-
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vatization of security is therefore used in this theory as a means of developing such legitimacy. 
By temporarily removing authority from the corrupt and disrespected institution that is the public 
police force, the government is better able to address security issues (Asfura-Heim and Espach, 
2013). Once the cartels have been brought to heel and the state restored as the single, legitimate 
source of force and violence, then public security can safely be reinstated.   
Phases and the Process of Democratization 
 Like Moreno-Brid, Ungar argues that economics and security are not as directly related 
as Foucault would suggest. However, where Moreno-Brid sees the process culminating in a re-
placement of delegitimized state structures, Ungar (2007) takes a wider look at the process of 
democratization in general to come to the conclusion that some degree of violence is to be ex-
pected in emerging democracies, but will consistently decrease.  As part of this process, all state 2
structures, including the police, do lose some degree of legitimacy by the people.  
 However, if democracy itself can become institutionalized at a cultural level, the people 
grow accustomed to a more responsive system. As public servants paid by public taxes, the po-
lice, in turn, grow more responsive. While private security may certainly play a role in the transi-
tion between an authoritarian and a democratic system, its use poses its own dangerous conse-
quences. Private security is even easier to buy off than public officers, as the former lacks any 
obligation to the public other than a financial transaction. As such, Ungar would argue that pri-
vate security should be actively avoided. Instead, Ungar suggests the secondary trend of commu-
 Ungar does not use the term, but this process has been referred to as the “civilization” thesis, articulated 2
perhaps most concisely by LaFree and Tseloni (2006) as a downward-sloping line. 
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nity-based police efforts as far superior. While these programs have historically lacked supervi-
sion or proper training, with enough of both, such programs would build legitimacy between the 
people and the state, while avoiding the dangerous undermining of that same legitimacy from 
private security (Ungar, 2007).  
State and Non-State Violent Actors in Caracas, Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro  
 The specific social, political, and economic factors which have enabled neoliberalism to 
generate an increase in violence in Latin American cities are best tested at the domestic level. 
The following three sections discuss the local policies of Caracas,Venezuela, Mexico City, Mexi-
co, and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and address the circumstances surrounding each city’s increase in 
militarized responses to cartels. Then, in an evaluation of each state’s proposed policing pro-
grams meant to address violence, I will compare the three propositions, and discuss their impli-
cations for future state success or subsequent loss of legitimacy by the national government. 
Caracas 
 Venezuela serves as both an outlier and a typical Latin American state. While not a strict-
ly neoliberal state, as the Venezuelan economy has only been partially nationalized, it is still im-
pacted by neoliberal economic and state policy.  Like most of the rest of the region, Venezuelan 
police policy follows the established pattern of penal statecraft (Muller, 2013). A disastrous eco-
nomic situation brought on by the ‘Great Recession’ in the United States and Europe has led to 
higher levels of theft and criminal activity, while at the same time the Venezuelan government’s 
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increased reliance on community policing efforts in the face of police-targeted attacks have done 
little to decrease violence by either civilian groups or the Venezuelan police.  
 Unlike Mexico or Brazil, Venezuela has made a conscious decision to step away from 
market capitalism, and instead uses a centralized, semi socialist model. However, as some politi-
cal economists have argued, Venezuela’s state socialism still embraces aspects of neoliberalism 
in that it needs to find ways to stay competitive in the global marketplace in order to sell its one 
major commodity, oil (Ungar, 2013). Though domestic economics has little direct effect on 
Venezuelan oil prices, the rampant levels of crime are linked over and over again to Venezuela’s 
high poverty rates.  
 Like most Latin American states, Venezuela’s police-civilian relationship is a tense one. 
As Gabaldon (2009) explains, police officers have strong distrust of the general public. Out of all 
police officer deaths, 87% have been the result of ambushes, only deepening the police’s genuine 
fear of criminals(Gabaldon, 2009). Despite the police’s fear, there are still eleven documented 
civilian deaths for every police ambush (Gabaldon, 2009). No amount of initiated police reform 
from assistance from the United States (such as when William Bratton, one of the architects of 
Zero-Tolerance Policing in New York City, came to Caracas to train police officers) or official 
policy adaptations from the National Commission for Police Reform have had any impact on 
lessening corruption and violence (Al Achkar, 2011). Indeed, after recent protests, the distrust 
between police and civilians has only increased.  
 This mutual distrust extends well past the Maduro administration. In 1939, the so-called 
“Law of Vagabonds and Crooks” enabled police officers to arrest citizens before any crime had 
been committed if the person was considered a “threat to society,” usually for homelessness or 
  Estevao !24
loitering (Ungar, 2003). While struck down in 1997, the institutionalized attitudes toward the 
poor as the enemy of society in Venezuela remains, and still serves as the source of legitimacy 
for the police’s extrajudicial actions (Ungar, 
2003). Such a legacy provides the police cover 
for widespread corruption and near complete 
lack of accountability to either the people or the 
Venezuelan government itself. While Maduro 
might promise to “revolutionize” the police 
forces (Weigold, 2014), police are still estimated 
to have committed one out of every five crimes 
in Venezuela (Human Rights Watch, 2011b). The 
chart at right, Figure 1, illustrates overall lack of satisfaction 
with Venezuelan police from a pool of 12,000 Venezuelans (Latinobarometro, 2014). From this 
data, it is clear the established relationship between the police and the citizenry has not resulted 
in a more respected or responsive police force.  
 Such distrust extends between the citizenry. Most alarmingly has been the dramatic in-
crease in civilian-on-civilian violence in Venezuela over the last ten to twenty years, most no-
tably in lynchings. Taking criminal justice into their own hands, these independent groups, re-
ferred to either as gangs or civilian militias, are tracking down criminals and publicly prosecut-
ing them, often trying and prosecuting them in the community as an independent organization 
(Ungar, 2007). These groups not only act with the support of the victims of those on the receiv-
ing end of this vigilante justice, but also with the surprisingly common support of the police 
Figure 2: Venezuelan Satisfaction With Police
Base=1200 
Weighted re-
sults
Number of 
cases
%/Total
Very satisfied 82 6.9%
Rather satisfied 228 19.0%
Not very 
satisfied
570 47.5%
Not at all 
satisfied
319 26.6%
Doesn´t know / 
No answer
1 0.1%
(N) (1,200) 100%
Source: Latinobarometro, 2014
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themselves. Under the Chavez administration in particular, vigilante groups went from being 
prosecuted as criminals themselves to being upheld as examples of citizen engagement in the 
New Venezuela (Ungar, 2007).   
 These gangs provide a fascinating testament to Venezuela’s unique political position.As 
semi-socialist, the concept of the proletariat-masses serves as the norm. The violence exhibited 
by these private actors then legitimizes the state from a social standpoint as much as its embrace 
of violence destabilizes the Maduro administration. Within a tyranny of the ‘majority,’ that is, the 
so-called ‘protector of the community,’ the contradictions between safety and autonomy prove 
divisive and dangerous, completely contradictory to any civilization thesis as outlined by LaFree 
and Tseloni.   
 However, these groups are still unstable, and their increasing connections to drug traf-
fickers makes them an unpopular choice with many in the current administration. In search of an 
alternative, private security is on the rise. In the past ten years, private security in Caracas has 
grown by over five hundred percent (Ungar, 2007), an unsurprising statistic considering the 
number of private property crimes which have gone without prosecution in recent years.   
 Unfortunately for Venezuela, this use of private security, while it intends to disassociate 
the corrupt police force with new public safety measures, only undermines the state’s authority. 
In a state like Venezuela, whose economic downturn, wild dissatisfaction with the administration, 
and genuine fear for personal safety (Werlau, 2014) have already undermined the government’s 
image, this increasing reliance on private security forces, many of whom themselves come from 
the police forces (and two percent of whom themselves have criminal records) (Al Achkar, 2011) 
serves more an admission of failure than a commitment to future success. 
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Mexico City 
 Mexico has elevated its efforts to expand economic neoliberalism after the signing of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Though this process has strengthened Mexi-
co’s connections to the United States, boosted its international political image, and led to some 
degree of political reform, it has also generated the same levels of massive economic displace-
ment as other states in the region (Moreno-Brid, Santamaria, and Valdivia, 2005). This economic 
displacement to Mexico City has only increased the predisposition of cartels (already growing in 
strength by NAFTA’s implementation) to prey on the urban informal sector.  In dealing with the 
brutality of the cartels, the Mexican government has militarized and privatized its police forces 
(Davis, 2006). Rather than reducing cartel violence, however, this process has only solidified 
these issues in Mexico City. As a result, more citizens are joining self-defense forces, or fuerzas 
autodefensas, whose role in the drug conflict, while undefined, holds potential for either gen-
uinely addressing the violence at the communal level, or further destabilizing the Mexican state.    
 Mexico’s neoliberal state polices stem from the country’s connection to the United States. 
Since the 1990s, the country has become the poster child for for what Markus Muller (2013) 
terms “penal statecraft,” that is, the process of using incarceration and arrests to manage social 
problems. The use of penal statecraft, combined with the massive emphasis on a small state, has 
created the exact steps described earlier of economic displacement leading to a criminalization of 
poverty. Mexico’s police reforms, even as they are supplemented by the private sector, appear 
unable to address the most important existential security threat to the state: the drug cartels 
(“Transcript” 2014).  
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 Of the three, Mexico holds the strongest connection to the United States. With the adop-
tion of NAFTA, the Mexican government openly adopted participation in the global free market 
and small government as public policy. Trade with Canada and the United States facilitated the 
creation of maquiladoras, or factories meant to spur widespread economic development through 
a manufacturing sector based on cheap labor. Like any other state with a neoliberal model, rural 
populations moved to the cities in search of work, in this case to Mexico City (Bernal-Meza and 
Christansen, 2012). Crucial to note is the significance of NAFTA as security policy. The relation-
ship NAFTA created takes the pattern of investment based on the security of private capital to the 
national level.  As such, ongoing violence and informalization of the Mexican labor market has 
come to be treated by both the United States and Mexico as a direct hinderance to the economic 
benefits NAFTA aims to provide (Olney, 2012).  
 NAFTA does indeed provide positive economic gains. Mexican GDP has steadily and 
significantly risen over the past ten years. While the economic recession which more deeply af-
fected the United States and Canada, Mexico did see a dramatic drop in 2008, the wider GDP 
numbers have recovered and continued to rise (World Bank, 2014). However, these numbers hide 
a significant economic pattern. NAFTA’s agricultural stipulations meant to benefit United States 
corn manufacturers destroyed much of Mexican domestic agricultural production. Now without 
desired skills, many farmers unable to make living on crop production move to the city slums, 
fueling Mexico’s informal slum economies (Moreno-Brid and Santamaria, 2005).  
 Indeed, the shock of opening the economy irrevocably damaged the domestic market, 
even in maquiladora production. The growth which has continued has remained both geographi-
cally and economically isolated. Rather than fuel a domestic boom, the development of Mexican 
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manufacturing has remained in the north along the US-Mexican border, and only in manufactur-
ing. The manufacturing sector itself imports the majority of means of production, and then ex-
ports the products themselves, preventing the economic growth in this sector from spreading to 
the rest of the economy (Moreno-Brid and Santamaria, 2005). Now, the Mexican government has 
shift the focus of economic development to the technology sector as well as manufactured ex-
ports. Rather than expanding the job market, by focusing on high technology industries, those 
economic opportunities for former farmers and others currently in the informal sector shrink 
(Iniguez-Montiel, 2014).  
 However, these numbers hide a significant economic pattern. NAFTA’s agricultural stipu-
lations meant to benefit US corn manufacturers destroyed much of Mexican domestic agricultur-
al production. Now without desired skills, many farmers unable to make living on crop produc-
tion move to the city slums, fueling Mexico’s informal slum economies (Moreno-Brid and San-
tamaria, 2005). 
 Mexico City serves as just one of many battlegrounds in Mexico in the “War on Drugs.” 
While other cities, especially Ciudad Juarez, have higher rates of violent death (WorldBank, 
2014b) (who can forget the stories and images of average people snatched and murdered by local 
cartels to terrify the population into submission?), Mexico City’s position as a center of govern-
ment courtship of foreign investors makes it better suited to this discussion.  
 The Mexican government’s strong relationship with the United States is reflected in its 
police policies as much as its economic ones. While cartels have operated within Mexico for 
years, the fracturing of Colombian organizations after the success of Plan Colombia encouraged 
the development of uniquely Mexican cartels. After the Cardenas administration militarized the 
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fight against the cartels, groups like Los Zetas, comprised of former military personnel (in an 
ironic twist of fate trained by the United States) gathered support. In response, the United States 
created the Merida Initiative, a multi-billion dollar fund meant to train and equip specialized 
anti-cartel units (Muller, 2013). 
 A replication of the United States’ own militarization, the increase in punitive measures 
for low-impact crimes (or entirely new crimes) since the 1990s has been termed “penal state-
craft” by Markus Muller (2013). The process of using incarceration and arrests to manage social 
problems, penal statecraft, combined with the neoliberal emphasis on a small state, has effective-
ly criminalized poverty in Mexico City’s public spaces (Muller, 2013). Mexico’s Civic and Cul-
ture Law increased incarcerations per day to over two hundred in Mexico City alone. Coinciden-
Figure 3: Murder Rate in Mexico (1961-2012)
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tally, the same year of NAFTA’s adoption, 1994, saw a massive spike in crime. Today, Mexico 
has a homicide rate of 21.5 per 100,000 (World Health Organization, 2014), largely considered 
the result of Cardenas’ militarization of the Drug War. That these figures are at the same level 
seen between 1961 and 1963 bodes ill for the Mexican state’s ability to address violence, particu-
larly since those levels are a net increase from a period of relative decline in homicide rates from 
1995 to 2006, as demonstrated by Figure 3, above. 
 Despite what the state’s policy would suggest, poverty does not necessarily lead to a life 
of crime, and connection between the informal economy and the significance of these crime sta-
tistics is not automatic. Rather, the factor that shifts the relationship between the people and the 
state from one of mutual ignorance and disconnect to a serious security threat for the Mexican 
state itself comes as a direct result of cartel activity and power in the informal sector.  
 Most of Mexico City’s poor are not cartel members. However, the lack of state presence 
in slums has created a perfect breeding ground for the cartels to form their own empires out of 
the urban landscape. This is made not only possible, but lucrative, because of the cartel’s own 
connections to police and state forces (Munoz 2014). Perhaps the greatest example of this twist-
ed relationship between the “law” and the criminal organization is that of Los Zetas. Comprised 
of former crack troops in the Mexican military who turned rouge and hired themselves out as 
killers for the Gulf Cartel before splitting and forming Los Zetas, are the most effective and 
technologically advanced cartel in history (InSightCrime, 2014). Beyond their military-grade ca-
pacity,  Los Zetas have created an effective terror organization with public body dumping, be-
headings, rapes, and bombings which has served to alternately subdue and enrage the population. 
Currently, Mexico City is not occupied by any one cartel, but it lies on the fault line between Los 
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Zetas, La Familia Michoacana, and the Sinaloa Cartel who, if they manage to close in on Mexico 
City, will certainly embrace the same model they have in previous cites (InSightCrime, 2014).  
 The government’s response to cartel violence both stems and results from Mexico’s tran-
sition to democracy. In Mexico, citizens have become more aware of their voting power after the 
historic ousting of the PRI in 2000. Now demanding a more responsive democratic process, the 
Mexican government finds itself needing to cater to the needs of the middle class. As the group 
most impacted by the random violence in cities like Juarez, the middle class in Mexico City has 
become the most vocal proponent of more aggressive policy toward the cartels (Malone, 2014). 
This comprised a large part of Cardenas’ platform, leading to his electoral triumph and subse-
quent declaration of a “war” on the cartels (Asfura-Heim and Espach, 2013). Though others sug-
gested instead a civil police-based approach which would treat cartels as any other criminal, the 
perceived corruption within local police and desire for a tougher stance made Cardenas’ policy 
the more popular (Davis, 2006).  
 The Drug War, far from ending cartel violence, has deepened it. In Mexico City, these  
attempts have involved both extrajudicial and community-based approaches. Policing, never es-
pecially civilian friendly, have only become more punitive. Victims are themselves implicated in 
crimes which affected them, and those arrested are guilty until proven innocent. Instead of ad-
dressing cartel violence, this type of “Zero-Tolerance Policing” has served to alienate large por-
tions of the population (Davis, 2006). The deepening of the association between cartels and the 
poor takes away the potential for police to connect with those communities most in direct con-
nection with the cartels.  
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 In a new approach, the Mexican government has attempted to move to the community 
level. Mexico United Against Delinquency and Citizen Protection Units both serve as examples 
of what Muller (2013) terms “public-private partnerships.” By funding and coordinating private 
community groups to provide community support in sectors the state has not reached, the pro-
gram aims to institutionalize police-citizen communication (Muller, 2013). However, many of 
these community efforts sprang from frustrations from those same communities from the state’s 
inability to act. These fuerzas autodefensas are made up of citizens who equip themselves and 
train together to protect themselves from the cartels. Theoretically, such a shift toward communi-
ty policing is beneficial for Mexican democracy as well as for the lower classes. In autodefensas, 
the poor gain control over their own security, flipping the narrative of the ‘dangerous poor’ on its 
head. As a literal part of the Weberian monopoly of violence, their involvement legitimizes both 
the state itself as a functioning system, and the relevance of the poor in a democracy. Thus ten-
dencies of the autodefensas to themselves turn to crime become only even more tragic. While 
these autodefensas are mostly found in rural areas where police forces have trouble accessing 
communities to be of any help, in recent years urban communities have followed suit as local 
police have become more deeply connected to the cartels. Unfortunately for both, autodefensas’ 
likelihood of turning to criminal actives including drug trafficking and extortion is no lower than  
that of the police (Asfura-Heim and Espach, 2013).  
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Rio de Janeiro 
 Rio de Janeiro, like Mexico City, finds its high rates of violence connected to the crimi-
nalization of poverty. Poverty in the Rio’s massive slums, or favelas, like Mexico City, was per-
viously entirely informal, but has in recent years undergone a serious incorporation effort by the 
Brazilian government with the implementation of two wildly popular and successful conditional 
cash transfer programs, Bolsa Familia and Bolsa Escola; two programs that exchange cash for 
keeping one’s children in school. By formalizing impoverished urban communities, the govern-
ment aims to bring the benefits of Brazil’s dramatic increase in economic development and state 
capacity since the beginning of the new millennium (Maia and Menezes, 2014). Unlike Mexico, 
the process that has led to community and independent policing in Brazil is not the result of car-
tels or collusion with the United States. Rather, it is the result of Brazil’s unique public policy 
structure.  
 Rio is by no means unusual in the scope and newness of its informal housing. Rio’s fave-
las, through among the earliest informal urban settlements in Latin America (populated by for-
mer slaves and ex-soldiers as early as the 19th century) were not formally recognized by the 
Brazilian state until 1979 (Perlman, 2010). This incorporation took place at the same time as the 
arrival of cocaine  to the city which generated an explosion of violence and gang activity, though 
never to the level of Mexico’s cartels (Huget and de Carvahlo, 2008).  
 Brazil has always had a militarized response to gangs even after the country’s transition 
to democracy. However, by 2002 the failure of traditional policing was clear. In Brazil, underpaid 
and undertrained police units actively worked alongside gangs (Alves and Evanson, 2011). Un-
like other state systems, Brazil’s police forces are divided into two departments. Investigating 
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crimes after they have been committed are the civil police. A reactionary force, they have little 
contact with communities outside of investigations, and have proven easy for drug lords to buy 
off. In an other branch are the military police. A kind of SWAT team, they interact with favela 
communities only in a violent context (Huget and de Carvalho, 2008). Underpaid and under-
trained, yet deeply feared by the populace for their connection to the dictatorship of previous 
yeas, they share the civil police’s reputation for corruption. However, in a more sinister twist, 
these officers also share a reputation for shooting first and asking questions never (Perlman, 
2010).  
  It is from these extrajudicial killings that the incentive for a new method of policing 
comes.  In recent years, rates of police “resistance killings” have exploded. Since 1980 alone, 
over twelve thousand Brazilian citizens are estimated to have been killed by elite and civil police 
squads in firefights or straightforward murders (Human Rights Watch, 2013a).  As Human Rights 
Watch explains from its 2009 survey, the Brazilian state and society as a whole began to see a 
strong disconnect between human rights and public safety in terms of criminal justice. Indeed, 
before the wide sweeping protests preceding and surrounding the 2014 World Cup, few civilian 
groups demonstrated against this trend en masse. In fact, patterns of increases in extrajudicial 
killings, rather than arrests can be easily linked to important political events and international 
stances for the Brazilian state. In these cases, police officers actively cover up the killings, or 
never report the death at all (Human Rights Watch, 2013a). Far from advocating more supervi-
sion, Brazilians when asked explain their opinion that stronger regulation of police forces in fact 
makes them weaker and less capable of addressing criminal behavior (Human Rights Watch, 
2013a).  
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 Unlike Mexico City, where security policy moves from the top down, these policies have 
so far been widely supported by non-favela residents. The New Left has, in Brazil, emerged 
largely triumphant. While it could be argued Brazil has squandered its economic gains, the coun-
try has seen dramatic improvement since 2000. Successfully paying off all international debts 
and bringing down inflation, the country saw itself rise to the top in investor confidence, earning 
its place among the ‘BRICs.’ Like other Latin American states, Brazil’s economic policies have 
generated wide spread structural unemployment, especially in the agricultural sector (Evange-
lista, 2013). However, with the election of Lula and the passing of social welfare programs like 
Bolsa Familia, Brazil’s youth population is far more educated and economically advantaged than 
the Brazilian youth of the 1980s and 90s.  
 With this economic development at the individual level comes the increasing democratic 
connection between the people and the policy makers. Brazil remains relatively unique in Latin 
America because of its strong municipal system imposed by the 1988 Constitution. Compared to 
the national government, municipalities have greater control over education and infrastructure, 
making the people’s connection to policy makers fairly strong (Sugiyama, 2013). At the same 
time, the large number of parties in the Brazilian legislature makes the opinions of the Brazilian 
people relatively strong compared to both Brazil’s own history and Latin America as a whole. 
Thus, the policies which prove successful in one part of the country can indeed by adopted in 
another after the encouragement of the population (Sugiyama, 2013). Such was the case with the 
expansion of the conditional cash transfer programs in the early 2000s, and the process seems to 
be gaining ground with community policing.  
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 At the same time, those same vocal youth sectors have become more critical within the 
favelas of widespread police corruption, and have somewhat successfully demanded new meth-
ods of policing. Better educated than their parents and immensely frustrated by the perpetual 
siege on their communities and discrimination from the “people of the pavement” (the term for 
non favela residents by those within favelas), these communities have begun to work with both 
nongovernment and government organizations to develop new police methods (Rodriguez, 
2006). The result has been the development of the Grupamento de Policiamento em Areas Espe-
ciais (Police Group for Special Areas).  
 These police units operate under an entirely different set of assumptions. Where civil and 
military police are reactive, the GPAE is proactive. Working alongside community leaders, the 
forces develop community-police goals which include gun control, a prohibition of police vio-
lence, prohibitions of children’s involvement in drug trafficking, and a prohibition of police cor-
ruption. In the pursuit of these goals, the Brazilian federal government has proven far more strict 
than ever before(Huget and de Carvalho, 2008). Out of a group of 100 GPAE officers, 70 were 
fired for corruption(Huget and de Carvalho, 2008). By openly cracking down on internal misde-
meanors, the GPAE earned the trust of the communities in which it worked. After only three 
years, homicide rates in GPAE communities reduced dramatically as community members 
worked with the police to find drug runners and gang members, and as the police eased the prac-
tice of blind shooting in residential areas (Huget and de Carvalho, 2008).  
 Brazil, then serves as perhaps the textbook example of the potentials of a well-function-
ing democracy, which with enough economic and social support, could devolution of security 
into a strengthening and legitimizing force for the state. If paired with a responsive and untainted 
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police force, communities can legitimize their grievances even as the state proves its capacity. If 
this trend can continue, so the upward swing posted by the modernization thesis after the trauma 
of transition.  
 However, these programs remain isolated in specific communities whose rates of vio-
lence tend to be lower, decreasing the risk to police and making more likely a public relations 
success. Instead of working with a specialized community police force, many other communities 
have created their own special units in the form of militias. Tired of seeing the police as an ene-
my against whom the community is defenseless, some community members turn to themselves. 
Comprised mostly of either off-duty or retired police officers and disgruntled young men, these 
self-appointed militias instill their own set of rules onto the community in efforts to drive away 
the gangs (Alves and Evanson, 2011). Imposing curfews and controlling who enters and exists 
the favelas by charging admission and setting up checkpoints, these groups are coming into con-
flict with both the police and the drug gangs who would control these areas (Perlman, 2010).  
Community-Based Policing 
 How then, is a weak democracy to manage the stresses of a corrupt police force, a drug 
cartel threat, and self-defense groups whose imposition of will seems to position them alongside 
the latter far more than is hopeful? Studies within Rio have demonstrated successes with com-
munity-based policing efforts (Tianhao, 2012). However, these efforts have only taken place thus 
far in middle-income areas of the city, in conjunction with a specialized, organized crime-fight-
ing federal unit. Mexico, too, is using community policing through its autodefensas, though 
within cartel-controlled areas. Though largely isolated to specific spaces, community policing 
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has the potential to spread, adapt, and improve along the lines of previous, successful policy ini-
tiatives.   
 Whereas top-down, militarized policies in Mexico have backfired and only led to an in-
crease in violence, and the corruption of local police forces combined with divisive and margin-
alizing economic policy, community-based policing offers a different means of addressing vio-
lent crime. In working against organized crime, community-based policing offers the ability for 
police units to learn how the cartel operates within an area. If a degree of trust can be established, 
it becomes possible to root out headquarters for criminal operations within the maze of a favela, 
to figure out the route drug shipments take, and who within the community is involved (Wia-
trowski, Pino, and Pritchard, 2008). At a departmental level, community connections also enable 
the police to prove corruption within their own ranks and remove those officers who collude with 
the gangs. In Brazil, whose community-based policing efforts have proven fairly successful at 
lowering rates of violent crime, improving relations between police and civilians, and lowering 
incidences of police brutality (Arias and Ungar, 2009).  
 What will be necessary for the policy to work will be the kind of social shift within poli-
cymaking circles seen in Brazil in the early 2000s in the creation and adoption of the Bolsa pro-
grams. Creating such a shift requires, in Sugiyama’s analysis of government policy changes, re-
quires a personal inclination toward such a change from both politicians and technocrats within 
the government (Sugiyama, 2013). In Latin America, such a suggestion might seem at first sur-
prising. The clientelism of most Latin American states, particularly those with high rates of vio-
lent crime, would suggest that politicians need only to exchange promises for votes, while rely-
ing on elites for institutionalized support. However, ideology and political motivation, when in-
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stitutionalized from within the government, provide the kind of unified front necessary to plan 
and execute a particular policy, and then continue with the policy long enough to move beyond 
initial disruptions and into potential successes (Sugiyama, 2013). 
 Such changes would face serious obstacles. As Arias and Ungar note, the same structures 
so essential to the success of community-based policing are weak in high-crime, low-income ar-
eas. Because community-based policing requires the heavy engagement of the citizenry, it also 
requires their trust (Arias and Ungar, 2009). As most communities do not trust the police, other 
civic organizations need to be created in order to provide the bridge between the communities 
and the police.  
 Community-based policing requires both the community’s involvement and the police 
department’s. While politicians and high-level bureaucrats are essential for the creation and sup-
port for such a program, the cooperation and support of mid-tier and low-level police officers are 
key to the success of community-based policing. Without their support, such attempts at trust-
building will fail. Preventing police from seeing these efforts as a usurpation of authority will 
require long-term retraining, difficult in the wake of legacies of authoritarianism and police 
forces used to high degrees of independence (Arias and Ungar, 2009).  
 This independence will need to change in several countries. Most Latin American states 
hold the police in a uniquely confusing position in the government apparatus.  Not a military op-
eration, but not fully under the authority of either the federal or provincial governments, all three 
claim some degree of jurisdiction, but wield little power over police within cities across the re-
gion. To hold police accountable in an effort to build the trust necessary for a community-based 
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policing strategy, police will need a clearer chain of command extending all the way up to some-
one who can be held accountable to the people (Felbab-Brown, 2011).  
 Brazil has used this strategy in its dual GPAE (community-based police)/military police 
strategy. By pairing a specialty-trained force with a militarized one, Brazil has been able to build 
some degree of trust between communities and police while continuing to match the firepower of 
the criminal organization. Indeed, areas within Rio de Janeiro which have adopted this strategy 
have seen decreases in homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants between 2001 and 2006 from po-
lice, in Copacabana as much as 25%, from 10 to 7.5 (Arias and Ungar, 2009).  
 However, to be successful in other states (as well as to maintain a level of success within 
Brazil), the dual strategy will need to address its serious problems of capacity. Already Brazil’s 
numbers of homicides in GPAE areas are slipping back up. To prevent the GPAE or the autode-
fensas from becoming yet another corrupt police uint, thereby discrediting themselves and com-
munity-based policing as an option for other states, training and disciplinary measures will need 
to stay at the center at the strategy, rather than become a minor aspect. 
Conclusion 
 What then is the role of community policing in addressing the violence which seems to 
blossom with the smaller state? While the object of this paper is not to prescribe any particular 
policy, it is worth noting the advantages and disadvantages of this particular trend. The Latino-
barometro survey cited earlier reflecting startlingly high rates of disinterest in democracy, pro-
vides an important indicator of the social context surrounding community police efforts.   
 When the same states accused of incompetence and treated with skepticism openly admit 
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to their own inability to manage public security, it sends a signal to both those who already ex-
press concern, and those who still have faith in the government, that they have good cause for 
concern. Mexico already faces accusations of being on the path toward failed state status (Al 
Jazeera, 2013). Colombia still struggles to shake off perceptions of being a kingpin’s playground, 
while Brazil and Venezuela have both seen the largest protests in years over the past few months. 
In such a social context, it is important for Latin American states to consider what public policy 
is expressing at a social level. While a neoliberal dream, private security is not considered in the 
public service by the left-leaning populations across the region, whose experiences with milita-
rized police working on behalf of specific sectors harkens back to the region’s dictatorial past. 
While such a specified public policy might not lead to the complete collapse of Latin American 
states with community policing efforts, the fact that these programs are so far unsuccessful will 
neither deepen the state’s legitimacy nor strengthen the state’s image as a safe bet for investors.  
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